A scooter parked in front of a residential building in Moscow was nothing unusual, as such electric vehicles are often used in the 13-million-strong Russian capital. But this scooter—a key element of a carefully planned deadly operation—carried an explosive device with 100 to 300 grams of TNT, according to Russian investigators. The bomb was placed near the building on Moscow’s Ryazansky Prospect by a covert operative on the orders of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU).
A hidden camera recorded the detonation of the bomb before dawn, as Colonel General Igor Kirillov, commander of Russia’s forces for radioactive, chemical, and biological defense, was leaving the building with his assistant. The explosion killed both men, according to the Financial Times. It was the latest assassination in the escalating war between Kyiv’s and Moscow’s state intelligence agencies. Both agencies are successors of the Soviet Union’s spy services, with the SBU being the direct heir of the Ukrainian branch of the KGB from the USSR era.
“Eliminators of Russians”
Operating behind enemy lines, these agencies have targeted military commanders and politicians, sabotaged energy infrastructure and railway systems, and employed hybrid warfare tactics, including cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. On the Ukrainian side, the often controversial SBU, which the U.S. and other allies have long pushed to reform, is motivated by internal competition with the military intelligence directorate known as GUR. The SBU has transformed, as one intelligence official put it, into “eliminators of Russians.”
An SBU official confirmed that his agency was responsible for Kirillov’s death, calling him a war criminal who ordered the use of banned chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces. “Such an inglorious end awaits all those who kill Ukrainians,” warned the official.
The SBU has largely focused on domestic politics, but since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it has operated within Ukraine’s occupied territories and in Russia itself. An intelligence official highlighted the assassinations of several pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moscow-controlled regions between 2014 and 2021, carried out by Kyiv’s agents.
Another intelligence official, who wished to remain anonymous, said SBU agents had operated within Russia’s borders but also employed Russians to carry out sabotage and even assassinations. On Wednesday, the FSB announced the arrest of an Uzbek national suspected of Kirillov’s assassination.
Fighting on Multiple Fronts
The SBU has become a key instrument in Ukraine’s fight against Russia on multiple fronts.
“Russia struggles to counter the SBU’s operations. The FSB is very good at investigating what has already happened but not as effective at gathering intelligence on what is coming. That’s a different skill set,” said Andrei Soldatov, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. He added: “For that, trust and information sharing among Russian agencies are needed, but there’s little of that.”
Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, a parliamentary deputy who was twice the head of the SBU, said the agency had gathered significant counterintelligence information and data on Russian military and intelligence leadership. The SBU has found ways to plant moles, breach communications within enemy territory, and identify vulnerabilities in Moscow’s intelligence network.
Part of the SBU’s effectiveness comes from its size, a legacy of the Soviet era. When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, the SBU inherited much of the KGB’s structure, resources, and responsibilities without restructuring. With over 30,000 employees and even more unregistered operatives, the SBU is very similar to the FBI, which has 35,000 agents. It is seven times larger than Britain’s MI5 and more than four times larger than Israel’s Mossad.
“One of the key tasks of the Security Service of Ukraine, especially during wartime, is to counter enemy special services,” said SBU Director Vasyl Malyuk to the Financial Times. Malyuk declined to comment directly on operations inside Russia but added: “The SBU’s stance is clear and unequivocal: every crime by the aggressor must be punished.”
Rarely Taking Credit for Assassinations
The SBU rarely publicly claims explicit responsibility for assassinations. In August 2022, the agency planted a car bomb that killed Darya Dugina, the daughter of Russian ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and an advocate for the war in Ukraine.
The SBU’s actions are often controversial. The agency staged a fake assassination of a Russian dissident journalist in Kyiv to expose Russian assassins, monitored investigative journalists and activists reporting on alleged corruption within the agency, and faced several scandals involving embezzlement. “The SBU has enormous power, some might say too much,” said one Western diplomat, adding that the agency has resisted significant reforms for years despite pressure from the U.S. and EU.
However, amid the war with Russia, Western nations have overlooked complaints and strengthened ties and intelligence-sharing. The agency has developed particularly close ties with the CIA, which has invested millions of dollars in training programs for Ukrainian agents.
The SBU has come a long way since late February 2014, when it was devastated by former President Viktor Yanukovych following the Euromaidan revolution. Before fleeing, Yanukovych ordered a raid on the agency, during which operatives stole key state secrets and burned what they couldn’t take. The SBU suffered significant defections in the spring and summer of that year as Russia annexed Crimea and took control of cities in eastern Ukraine.
As the new SBU director at the time, Nalyvaichenko inherited an agency riddled with spies loyal to the Kremlin. Thousands of agents were suspected of collaborating with the enemy. A purge followed, with authorities arresting many of their own agents and launching investigations into treason. Nalyvaichenko said Kyiv brought in younger, patriotic agents loyal to Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion began, hardly a month has passed without headlines about SBU operatives eliminating a Russian official.
The Assassination of Trankovsky
In November, the SBU took responsibility for the assassination of Valeriy Trankovsky, chief of staff of the 41st missile brigade of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet. Trankovsky was killed in a car bomb explosion in Russian-occupied Crimea. However, there are instances where credit is given to the military intelligence directorate known as GUR. Under the command of Kyrylo Budanov, GUR has also carried out covert operations and assassinations far behind enemy lines.
The two agencies compete, each trying to outdo the other in assassinations of senior officials or attacks on significant military targets deeper inside Russia. However, they sometimes collaborate. Kirillov’s assassination has alarmed the Russian defense establishment. Russian war correspondent Yury Kotenok wrote that Ukrainian intelligence services operate freely and with impunity across Russia: “It is evident to everyone that Kyiv is behind this, but the fact that the enemy practically boasts about it openly is quite telling.”