This reflection was initially meant to take a different path, starting from the recent terrorist attack in Bosanska Krupa. However, Ilija Nakić, an HDZ BiH representative in the House of Peoples of the Federation’s Parliament and a retired general, while appearing on the Kompas show on RTV Herceg-Bosna, pointed out that the member of the BiH Presidency, Željka Cvijanović, claims there are Mujahideen camps in the country, while Defense Minister Zukan Helez insists there are Russian camps. Meanwhile, the “Croatian camps,” as Nakić termed them, are within the Armed Forces of BiH.
By: Josip Vričko, Katolički Tjednik
A Letter for a Letter
“All actions recognized by law are supported by Croats and Croatian politics, and we should continue to support them,” Nakić said, referencing the recent “Karić case,” where Sarajevo’s mayor, Benjamina Karić, took a photo with a young boy in camouflage uniform during her election campaign preparations for the mayoral position in Sarajevo’s Centar Municipality. The photo served as a stark example of child militarization.
It’s worth recalling that just a slightly older boy than the one adorning Karić’s campaign image, Elmir S., retaliated with a knife attack on police officers in Bosanska Krupa. He explained on social media that this was in protest against their support for Zionists allegedly killing innocent Muslims.
But let’s return to the camps, which General Nakić directed us to consider. On November 12, 2023, a group of MPs from Republika Srpska wrote to the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament, claiming that Bosnia and Herzegovina has long been a haven for radical Islamists. Shortly after, their counterparts from the Federation of BiH responded with a letter to the same addresses, arguing that the biggest threat to peace in BiH was not imagined religious radicalism but the actions of SNSD officials, most notably Milorad Dodik, many of whom are on U.S. and UK blacklists.
Adding fuel to this story, Zukan Helez announced on November 23 that Russian camps exist in BiH. Acting as a self-proclaimed arbiter, BiH Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković stated: “I trust Defense Minister Helez more when he says there are Russian camps in BiH than I trust the letter from Banja Luka parliamentarians claiming there are Mujahideen camps.”
Where Did Helez See Russians?
In spring 2024, Helez doubled down on his previous claims, stating, “Since the start of the Ukraine war, 14,000 Russians entered BiH, and about 140,000 entered Serbia. Serbia has training grounds, and BiH had one on RS territory in eastern Bosnia, but it has since been shut down.”
Despite denials from both Belgrade and Banja Luka, Helez stood firm. However, nearly a year after Helez first raised the alarm, on May 6, 2024, the BiH Prosecutor’s Office issued a directive to close the investigation, as no evidence was found to support the existence of “Russian camps” in BiH, as per their October 25 announcement.
Meanwhile, Moldovan media alleged that terrorists were being trained in RS just before elections. The BiH Prosecutor’s Office dismissed these claims as well, stating there was no evidence of terrorist training in BiH intended for Moldova. Some Bosniak media, disappointed by this outcome, questioned why the Prosecutor’s Office took so long to respond.
And Then Came Bosanska Krupa
On October 25, in Bosanska Krupa, a “quiet and introverted” 14-year-old electrical school student killed one police officer and critically injured another. While such an event might have overshadowed discussions about (phantom) camps, few Bosniak media outlets took this incident seriously. Even though the Una-Sana Canton Prosecutor’s Office classified the teenager’s actions as a terrorist act, with motives rooted in attacking an institution and intimidating the population, the broader narrative remained muted. The investigation was later handed over to the BiH Prosecutor’s Office, leading to the swift arrest of seven suspects, who were reportedly directly linked to the indoctrination of the minor.
The Role of a Qur’an School
Five of the suspects were released on October 28 under restrictive measures, while two were exonerated. Prosecutor Ćazim Hasanspahić explained that measures were requested due to the ongoing investigation into their alleged involvement in terrorism and recruitment for terrorist activities.
One notable reaction came from SDA vice-president Haris Zahiragić, who criticized the arrests. He argued that the individuals included respected figures such as Hafiz scholars and professors, some of whom were associated with a Qur’an school attended by the teenage perpetrator. Zahiragić rhetorically asked: “Is organizing a Qur’an school a criminal act?”
While the school itself is not inherently a criminal activity, further investigations revealed troubling details. According to documents obtained by the Sarajevo-based portal raport.ba, the young terrorist was significantly influenced by Hajrudin Šabić, a police officer linked to the Salafi movement. Additionally, the minor attended a parajamaat in Bosanska Krajina.
Final Thoughts
In the aftermath of the Bosanska Krupa attack, both the BiH Islamic Community leader, Husein ef. Kavazović, and the Security Minister expressed concerns about the role of social media in radicalizing youth. However, the evidence suggests the problem lies much deeper, pointing toward extremist ideologies proliferating through parajamaats and informal religious gatherings.
Despite some dismissing the broader issue, the events in Bosanska Krupa serve as a stark reminder that radicalization in BiH remains a real and present threat, extending far beyond speculative camps or social media influences.
Here are brief explanations of the names mentioned in the text:
- Ilija Nakić: A retired general and representative of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) in the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Parliament.
- Željka Cvijanović: A member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Republika Srpska and a former Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, aligned with the SNSD party.
- Zukan Helez: The Minister of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who has been vocal about alleged Russian involvement in BiH.
- Elmedin Konaković: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, known for his public commentary on regional and international issues.
- Milorad Dodik: The President of Republika Srpska and leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), often criticized for his nationalist policies and listed under U.S. and U.K. sanctions.
- Haris Zahiragić: A vice-president of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and a prominent figure within Bosniak nationalist politics.
- Mustafa Ružnić: Former Prime Minister of Una-Sana Canton, a political leader in a region heavily impacted by migration and security concerns.
- Husein ef. Kavazović: The Grand Mufti (Reis-ul-Ulema) of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a central religious authority for Bosnian Muslims.
- Nenad Nešić: The Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, responsible for overseeing security-related matters, including counter-terrorism.
- Hajrudin Šabić: A police officer from Bosanska Krupa reportedly linked to the Salafi movement and implicated in the indoctrination of the teenage perpetrator.
- Muharem Bajrić, Dževdet Mujović, Hakija Kanurić: Individuals associated with the Salafi movement or informal religious groups in BiH, some of whom are linked to the alleged indoctrination of the perpetrator in Bosanska Krupa.
- Jusuf Barčić: A former Salafi preacher in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regarded as a leading figure of radical Islamic groups before his death in 2007.
These individuals are central to understanding the political, religious, and security dynamics discussed in the article.